КФУ. Карточка публикации. CEO power, government monitoring, and bank dividends

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CEO POWER, GOVERNMENT MONITORING, AND BANK DIVIDENDS

Форма представления

Статьи в зарубежных журналах и сборниках

Год публикации

2016

Язык

английский

Авторы, сотрудники КФУ

Галиахметова Рамиля Расимовна, автор

Другие авторы

Molyneux Philip , автор

Onali Enrico , автор

Torluccio Giuseppe , автор

Библиографическое описание на языке оригинала

Onali Е., Galiakhmetova R. CEO power, government monitoring, and bank dividends / E. Onali, R. Galiakhmetova, Ph. Molyneux, G. Torluccio // Journal of Financial Intermediation. - 2016. - Vol. 27. - P. 89–117.

Аннотация

We investigate the role of CEO power and government monitoring on bank dividend policy for a sample of 109 European listed banks for the period 2005–2013. We employ three main proxies for CEO power: CEO ownership, CEO tenure, and unforced CEO turnover. We show that CEO power has a negative impact on dividend payout ratios and on performance, suggesting that entrenched CEOs do not have the incentive to increase payout ratios to discourage monitoring from minority shareholders. Stronger internal monitoring by board of directors, as proxied by larger ownership stakes of the board members, increases performance but decreases payout ratios. These findings are contrary to those from the entrenchment literature for non-financial firms. Government ownership and the presence of a government official on the board of directors of the bank, also reduces payout ratios, in line with the view that government favors the interest of bank creditors before the interest of minority shareholders.

Ключевые слова

CEO power, Dividends, Entrenchment, Government monitoring, Banks

Название журнала

Journal of Financial Intermediation

Ссылка для РПД

http://dspace.kpfu.ru/xmlui/bitstream/handle/net/105915/CEO_power__government_monitoring__and_bank_dividends.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

URL

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1042957315000388

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https://repository.kpfu.ru/?p_id=141686

Файлы ресурса

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CEO_power__government_monitoring__and_bank_dividends.pdf	0,70	pdf	посмотреть / скачать

Полная запись метаданных

Поле DC	Значение	Язык
dc.contributor.author	Галиахметова Рамиля Расимовна	ru_RU
dc.contributor.author	Molyneux Philip	ru_RU
dc.contributor.author	Onali Enrico	ru_RU
dc.contributor.author	Torluccio Giuseppe	ru_RU
dc.date.accessioned	2016-01-01T00:00:00Z	ru_RU
dc.date.available	2016-01-01T00:00:00Z	ru_RU
dc.date.issued	2016	ru_RU
dc.identifier.citation	Onali Е., Galiakhmetova R. CEO power, government monitoring, and bank dividends / E. Onali, R. Galiakhmetova, Ph. Molyneux, G. Torluccio // Journal of Financial Intermediation. - 2016. - Vol. 27. - P. 89–117.	ru_RU
dc.identifier.uri	https://repository.kpfu.ru/?p_id=141686	ru_RU
dc.description.abstract	Journal of Financial Intermediation	ru_RU
dc.description.abstract	We investigate the role of CEO power and government monitoring on bank dividend policy for a sample of 109 European listed banks for the period 2005–2013. We employ three main proxies for CEO power: CEO ownership, CEO tenure, and unforced CEO turnover. We show that CEO power has a negative impact on dividend payout ratios and on performance, suggesting that entrenched CEOs do not have the incentive to increase payout ratios to discourage monitoring from minority shareholders. Stronger internal monitoring by board of directors, as proxied by larger ownership stakes of the board members, increases performance but decreases payout ratios. These findings are contrary to those from the entrenchment literature for non-financial firms. Government ownership and the presence of a government official on the board of directors of the bank, also reduces payout ratios, in line with the view that government favors the interest of bank creditors before the interest of minority shareholders.	ru_RU
dc.language.iso	ru	ru_RU
dc.subject	CEO power	ru_RU
dc.subject	Dividends	ru_RU
dc.subject	Entrenchment	ru_RU
dc.subject	Government monitoring	ru_RU
dc.subject	Banks	ru_RU
dc.title	CEO power, government monitoring, and bank dividends	ru_RU
dc.type	Статьи в зарубежных журналах и сборниках	ru_RU